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SECOND AMENDMENT PLUMBING AFTER MCDONALD: EXPLORING
THE CONTRADICTION IN THE SECOND AMENDMENT
Lawrence Rosenthal

It took two landmark decisions to reach the end of the beginning. In
District of Columbia v. Heller,1 the Supreme Court, adopting what it characterized as “the original understanding of the Second Amendment,”2 held
that the Second Amendment secures an individual’s right to keep and bear
arms against the federal government. On that basis, the Court invalidated
the District of Columbia’s prohibition on the possession of handguns.3 In
McDonald v. City of Chicago,4 the Court concluded that by virtue of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Second Amendment right to keep and bear
arms is enforceable against state and local governments.5 Now, the more
prosaic but perhaps more important work begins. It is time to start putting
the doctrinal “plumbing” in place.6
A.
Likely the most important piece of plumbing that will need to be installed is the standard of scrutiny to be applied to gun control laws challenged under the Second Amendment. This is no small matter. As Eugene
Volokh has observed, in light of the many difficulties in assessing the efficacy of gun control laws, a rigorous form of strict scrutiny, requiring the
government to demonstrate that a challenged regulation is the essential

1

554 U.S. 570 (2008).
Id. at 625.
3
Id. at 628–35.
4
130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
5
Id. at 3050 (plurality opinion) (relying on the Due Process Clause); id. at 3077–88 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (relying on the Privileges or Immunities Clause).
6
For the source of the metaphor, see Stuart Banner, The Second Amendment, So Far, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 898, 90708 (2004) (reviewing DAVID C. WILLIAMS, THE MYTHIC MEANINGS OF THE SECOND
AMENDMENT: TAMING POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN A CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC (2003)).
2
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means for achieving a compelling governmental interest, would likely be
the death knell for most gun control laws.7
The Supreme Court has not offered much guidance on the Second
Amendment standard of scrutiny. In Heller, the Court invalidated the District’s ban on handguns and its requirement that all firearms in a home remain unloaded and inoperable.8 At the same time, the Court refused to
decide what type of justification is required for firearms regulation, although it did reject both a test limited to ascertaining whether a challenged
regulation lacks a rational basis9 and Justice Breyer’s proposed interestbalancing test.10 In McDonald, the Court was silent on the Second Amendment standard of scrutiny, with a four-Justice plurality adding only that
Fourteenth Amendment standards for state and local gun control laws are
no different than those applied to the federal government under the Second
Amendment.11 Since Heller, commentators have sharply divided on the appropriate standard for scrutiny under the Second Amendment,12 as have the
lower courts.13
7

See Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 146568 (2009). For a helpful discussion of the difficulties in assembling empirical evidence of the efficacy of gun control laws, see MARK
V. TUSHNET, OUT OF RANGE: WHY THE CONSTITUTION CAN’T END THE BATTLE OVER GUNS 77–85
(2007).
8
554 U.S. at 628–30.
9
Id. at 628 n.27.
10
Id. at 634–35.
11
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3048 (2010) (plurality opinion). Justice Thomas’s separate opinion suggests this symmetry as well, see id. at 3083 (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment), although he left open the question whether noncitizens may assert
Second Amendment rights against state and local governments, see id. at 3084 n.19. To be sure, a majority characterized the right to keep and bear arms as “fundamental,” see id. at 3041–42 (opinion of the
Court), and there is authority suggesting that burdens on rights regarded as fundamental should be subject to strict scrutiny, see, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23, 3031 (1968). This rule, however, is not invariably applied. See Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 696700 (2007). More important for present purposes, we will see that the Second Amendment contains a textual basis for regulatory authority that
makes strict scrutiny unwarranted. See infra Part I.B.
12
See, e.g., Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Scope of the Second Amendment RightPost-Heller Standard of
Review, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 43, 66–71 (2009) (enhanced rational basis review); Carlton F.W. Larson,
Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit,
60 HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1379–80 (2009) (something less than strict scrutiny); Calvin Massey, Second
Amendment Decision Rules, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1431, 1442–43 (2009) (regulation must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence to advance a compelling governmental interest); Lawrence Rosenthal,
Second Amendment Plumbing After Heller: Of Standards of Scrutiny, Incorporation, Well-Regulated
Militias, and Criminal Street Gangs, 41 URB. LAW. 1, 79–84 (2009) (undue burden test); Allen Rostron,
Protecting Gun Rights and Improving Gun Control After District of Columbia v. Heller, 13 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 383, 407–08 (2009) (reasonableness test); Mark Tushnet, District of Columbia v. Heller
and the Perils of Compromise, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 419, 423–32 (2009) (strict scrutiny); Volokh, supra note 7, at 1454–61 (regulations imposing a substantial burden on Second Amendment rights
should be evaluated by assessing the “magnitude of the burden” in light of its justification); Jason T.
Anderson, Note, Second Amendment Standards of Review: What the Supreme Court Left Unanswered in
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To make matters more concrete, consider the potential Second
Amendment right to carry firearms in public. The Second Amendment
provides, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”14 In Heller, the Court cautioned that:
“[T]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and
phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical
meaning.” Normal meaning may of course include an idiomatic meaning, but
it excludes secret or technical meanings that would not have been known to
ordinary citizens in the founding generation.15

The Court then relied on framing-era sources to define “arms” as “weapons . . . ‘in common use at the time,’”16 the right to “keep” arms as the
right to possess them,17 and the right to “bear” arms as the right to “carry[]
for a particular purpose—confrontation.”18 The Second Amendment provides that these rights “shall not be infringed.” According to what was likely the leading early American dictionary, Noah Webster’s 1828 American
Dictionary of the English Language, “infringed” meant “[b]roken, violated,
transgressed,”19 which seems to support a vigorous conception of an individual right to possess and carry firearms.20 Indeed, in Heller, while noting
District of Columbia v. Heller, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 547, 577–87 (2009) (intermediate scrutiny); Ryan L.
Card, Note, An Opinion Without Standards: The Supreme Court’s Refusal to Adopt a Standard of Constitutional Review in District of Columbia v. Heller Will Likely Cause Headaches for Future Judicial
Review of Gun-Control Regulations, 23 BYU J. PUB. L. 259, 286–87 (2009) (same); Lindsay Goldberg,
Note, District of Columbia v. Heller: Failing to Establish a Standard for the Future, 68 MD. L. REV.
889, 904–13 (2009) (strict scrutiny); Andrew R. Gould, Comment, The Hidden Second Amendment
Framework Within District of Columbia v. Heller, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1535, 1570–73 (2009) (a “deferential form of strict scrutiny”); Sarah Perkins, Note, District of Columbia v. Heller: The Second Amendment Shoots One Down, 70 LA. L. REV. 1061, 107990 (2010) (intermediate scrutiny); Jason Racine,
Note, What the Hell[er]? The Fine Print Standard of Review Under Heller, 29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 605,
617–20 (2009) (undue burden).
13
For a recent decision usefully summarizing the disarray in the lower courts, see Heller v. District
of Columbia, 698 F. Supp. 2d 179, 184–86 (D.D.C. 2010). At the appellate level, there has been something of a trend toward a form of intermediate scrutiny requiring that the challenged regulation be substantially related to an important governmental objective. See, e.g., United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d
673, 682–83 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800–04 (10th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641–42 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d
85, 95–98 (3d Cir. 2010).
14
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
15
554 U.S. at 576–77 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731
(1931)).
16
Id. at 627 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)).
17
Id. at 582.
18
Id. at 584.
19
1 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 110 (1828).
20
See, e.g., STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THE FOUNDERS’ SECOND AMENDMENT: ORIGINS OF THE
RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 328–30 (2008); David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1359, 1404–09.
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in dicta that “the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues,”21 the Court added that
antebellum nineteenth-century cases had understood the Second Amendment to secure a right to carry firearms openly.22 Professor Volokh, even
while rejecting strict scrutiny of gun control laws, has opined that Heller
likely secures a right to carry loaded firearms in public, at least openly.23
He has also expressed doubt about prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons, stating that there is not much beyond the Heller dictum and their historical pedigree to support these laws.24 I have also expressed doubts about
whether these laws can survive Heller.25
The consequences for urban law enforcement are potentially serious.
As I have demonstrated elsewhere, the unprecedented spike in violent crime
from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s was largely a function of urban firearms-related crime in disadvantaged and unstable inner-city neighborhoods,
arising from competition in emerging markets for crack cocaine.26 The ability of gang members and drug traffickers “to possess and carry weapons in
case of confrontation”27 was central to this violent competition, since the
creation and control of territorial drug-distribution monopolies involved the
ready availability of firearms.28 There is, in turn, substantial evidence that
the large declines in urban crime that followed the crime spike were attributable to aggressive stop-and-frisk tactics, which made it far riskier to carry guns and drugs in public.29 Prohibitions on carrying weapons, in turn,
played an important role in these police tactics, since they confer upon police a critical source of stop-and-frisk authority whenever officers reasonably suspect a suspect to be carrying a firearm.30 Recognition of a
constitutional right to carry firearms, at least openly, would grant drug traffickers and gang members effective immunity from stop-and-frisk tactics,
potentially crippling the fight against urban violent crime.31
21

554 U.S. at 626.
Id. at 612–13.
23
See Volokh, supra note 7, at 1516–20.
24
See id. at 1521–24.
25
Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 45–47.
26
See id. at 7–15.
27
554 U.S. at 592.
28
See Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 15–20.
29
See id. at 30–35.
30
See id. at 37–44.
31
See id. at 45–48. One article questions this conclusion, speculating that police would respond to a
constitutional right to carry firearms by utilizing alternate grounds for stop-and-frisk, “such as suspicion
of drug crimes or even curfew violations” or relying on an “officer safety justification.” Philip J. Cook,
Jens Ludwig & Adam M. Samaha, Gun Control After Heller: Threats and Sideshows from a Social Welfare Perspective, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1080 n.214 (2009). This speculation rests on an assumption
that there is some sort of equilibrium of reasonable suspicion such that if one basis for suspicion becomes unavailable to officers, they can always shift to another. The authors offer no support for this as22
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Thus, the stakes are high. A vigorous conception of Second Amendment rights could enable urban street gangs to act as occupying armies. As
long as they commit no overt crimes while police officers are present, they
could use their ability to go about armed to establish criminal mini-states
based on drug trafficking—much as they did during the crime-spike era.32
Everything depends on the type of justification that courts will require to
regulate the possession of guns.33
sumption, however, and there is little basis to suppose that when one justification for stop-and-frisk is
eliminated, police can always come up with another. Given that police in departments committed to aggressive stop-and-frisk practices already have an incentive to maximize stop-and-frisk rates, it is doubtful that a reduction in stop-and-frisk authority of one type will be offset by increasing stop-and-frisk
authority on other grounds.
The available data, moreover, show that weapons searches are an especially important source of
stop-and-frisk authority for departments that use stop-and-frisk tactics aggressively. For example, in
New York, in an eighteen-month period studied by the Attorney General during the crime-decline period, stop-and-frisks reflected in mandated reports based on suspected weapons offenses made up 44.6%
of all stops, while suspected drug offenses were involved in 8.4% and misdemeanor/quality of life offenses were involved in 7.7%. CIVIL RIGHTS BUREAU, OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN. OF THE STATE OF
N.Y., THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT’S “STOP AND FRISK” PRACTICES app. tbl.I.A.5 (1999),
available at http://books.google.com/books?id=fGJTRZgvUBoC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_
ge_summary_r&cad=0. Reports are mandated “when a suspect is (i) ‘stopped’ by the use of force; (ii)
frisked (i.e., patdown) and/or ‘searched’ (i.e., searched inside clothing); (iii) arrested; or (iv) ‘stopped’
and the suspect refused to identify him or herself.” Id. at 6364 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).
For all reports, even if not mandated, 19.2% are based on suspicion of violent crime, 34.0% are based on
weapons offenses, 15.8% are based on property crime, 8.7% are based on drug offenses, and 10.2% are
based on misdemeanor/quality of life offenses. Id. at 10910 & tbl.I.A.5.
Moreover, there is no free-floating authority consistent with the Fourth Amendment to stop and frisk
an individual based on “officer safety” absent reasonable suspicion that the suspect is engaged in unlawful activity. The rule permitting a stop-and-frisk based on reasonable suspicion permits an officer to approach a suspect “for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
22 (1968). This requirement is fully applicable to stop-and-frisks involving suspected firearms. See,
e.g., Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000) (“Our decisions recognize the serious threat that armed
criminals pose to public safety; Terry’s rule, which permits protective police searches on the basis of
reasonable suspicion rather than demanding that officers meet the higher standard of probable cause,
responds to this very concern. But an automatic firearm exception to our established reliability analysis
would rove too far.” (citation omitted)). Thus, Terry requires suspicion of illegality; it follows that
when applicable law does not ban carrying a firearm, the Fourth Amendment does not permit a stopand-frisk for firearms because there is no reason to believe that the suspect violated any law. See, e.g.,
United States v. Burton, 228 F.3d 524, 528–30 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213,
217–18 (3d Cir. 2000); Gomez v. United States, 597 A.2d 884, 890–91 (D.C. 1991); Commonwealth v.
Couture, 552 N.E.2d 538, 541 (Mass. 1990); 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE
ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.6(a) (4th ed. 2004). Heller leaves open the possibility of requiring a
license to carry firearms, see 554 U.S. at 631, but in the context of vehicles, the Court has held that the
Fourth Amendment forbids investigative stops to check the license and registration of a vehicle absent
some particularized reason to believe that the suspect has violated licensing requirements or another law.
See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 65563 (1979); see also City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,
531 U.S. 32, 4048 (2000) (invalidating roadblocks to check vehicles for guns and drugs in high-crime
areas).
32
See Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 1114, 4548.
33
Some have argued that the Second Amendment right should be limited to possessing and using
firearms within one’s home, since privacy interests subside and governmental regulatory interests are
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B.
At first blush, Heller seems to clinch the case for a right of gang members and drug dealers to carry firearms. As we have seen, Heller defined
the right to “bear” arms as a right to carry firearms for purposes of confrontation. The Court did not define the right in terms limited to those who carry for purposes of legitimate self-defense; indeed, it explained that the term
includes “the carrying of the weapon . . . for the purpose of ‘offensive or defensive action,’”34 adopting a definition of “carry” originally used in connection with a federal statute that enhances sentences for anyone who “dur“during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking
crime . . . uses or carries a firearm.”35 Thus, it seems that even the criminally minded have a right to “bear” arms.
Yet there is more going on in Heller than first meets the eye. The
Court took a rigorously textualist approach when defining the right to “keep
and bear arms,” but when it considered whether the District of Columbia’s
handgun ban ran afoul of the Second Amendment, the Court found that textualism offered little assistance. Instead of making an effort to determine
whether a handgun ban “infringed” the right to keep and bear arms in light
of the original meaning of that term, the Court approached the question in a
greater once firearms are taken outside the home. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Does Heller Protect a
Right to Carry Guns Outside the Home?, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 225, 23133 (2008); Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1297–
355 (2009). Whatever the merits of this view in terms of policy, however, it is hard to reconcile with
Heller’s textualism. As we have seen, Heller defined the right to bear arms to include carrying weapons
for purposes of confrontation, and it does not seem particularly plausible to understand this analysis of
the text as recognizing only a right to “bear” arms from the bedroom to the living room. For additional
critical discussion of this understanding of Second Amendment rights, see Eugene Volokh, The First
and Second Amendments, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 97 (2009), http://www.columbialawreview.org/
Sidebar/volume/109/97_Volokh.pdf.
Others have argued that Second Amendment doctrine should adopt the rule found in First Amendment doctrine that permits reasonable regulation of the time, place, and manner of speech and apply it to
the right to keep and bear arms. See, e.g., Christopher A. Chrisman, Mind the Gap: The Missing Standard of Review Under the Second Amendment (and Where to Find It), 4 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 289
(2006); Janice Baker, Comment, The Next Step in Second Amendment Analysis: Incorporating the Right
to Bear Arms into the Fourteenth Amendment, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 35, 57–60 (2002); Gary E. Barnett, Note, The Reasonable Regulation of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
607, 621–28 (2008).
Yet the analogy between First and Second Amendment rights is a difficult one because “the right to
arms stems from concerns about self defense and the defense of public liberty. . . . [T]he Second
Amendment’s right to arms is about capabilities more than expression.” Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Guns
and Gay Sex: Some Notes on Firearms, the Second Amendment, and “Reasonable Regulation,”
75 TENN. L. REV. 137, 147–48 (2007) (footnote omitted). Beyond that, First Amendment doctrine treats
deferentially laws directed not at the content of speech but rather at some nonspeech evil, whereas gun
control laws are usually directed at the right to keep and bear arms as defined in Heller. See Tushnet,
supra note 12, at 429–31.
34
Heller, 554 U.S. at 584 (quoting Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 143 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
35
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006).
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more indirect way, perhaps recognizing that the term “infringed” is ambiguous as applied to a law that permits the District’s residents to possess
some types of “arms” but not others. The Court wrote that “[t]he handgun
ban amounts to a prohibition of an entire class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for that lawful purpose,” and “extends,
moreover, to the home, where the need for defense of self, family, and
property is most acute.”36 It added that “[f]ew laws in the history of our Nation have come close to the severe restriction of the District’s handgun ban.
And some of those few have been struck down.”37 Handguns, the Court
wrote, are considered “the quintessential self-defense weapon.”38 The Court
also characterized a number of firearms regulations as “presumptively lawful,”39 including “prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons,” and “prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and
government buildings.”40
Commentators have suggested that the Court took a categorical approach in which “core” Second Amendment interests receive something
close to absolute protection, while more penumbral interests are subject to
greater regulation.41 Still, it is far from clear how to go about determining
whether a challenged regulation implicates only penumbral interests. Framing-era practice appears to be of little help. Not only did the Court claim no
historical support for a core-and-penumbra approach, but it also acknowledged that there was little framing-era support for firearms regulation aside
from laws addressing gunpowder storage and the discharge of firearms.42
Nevertheless, the Court treated some regulations that lack support in framing-era practice as presumptively lawful. Prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons, for example, did not emerge in the United States until the
1820s and 1830s in response to a surge in violent crime in the nation’s
growing cities.43 Prohibitions on the possession of firearms by convicted felons were uncommon until they emerged in the twentieth century in response to a crime wave that followed the First World War.44 For this
36

554 U.S. at 628.
Id. at 629.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 627 n.26.
40
Id. at 626.
41
See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 404–11 (2009); Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and
Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 976–77 (2009).
42
554 U.S. at 632–34.
43
See, e.g., SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE
ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 138–44 (2006); Saul Cornell, The Early American Origins of
the Modern Gun Control Debate: The Right to Bear Arms, Firearms Regulation, and the Lessons of History, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 571, 582–85 (2006).
44
See C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
695, 698–728 (2009).
37
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reason, some have denounced the Court’s treatment of these “presumptively
lawful” regulations as inconsistent with the Court’s originalist analysis.45
Perhaps Heller’s dicta regarding presumptively lawful firearms regulation will one day be discarded as inconsistent with the original meaning of
the Second Amendment. After all, in the operative clause, the only term
that could be thought to support a regulation of the right to “carry” “in case
of confrontation” is the term “infringed,” and as we have seen, that term, at
least as a matter of its common framing-era usage, does not appear to allow
regulatory power over the right to bear arms. There is, however, a textual
basis for regulatory authority: the Second Amendment’s preamble, in particular its reference to “[a] well regulated militia.”
In Heller, the Court explained that the original meaning of the term
“militia” was not the members of a formal military organization, but rather
“the body of all citizens capable of military service, who would bring the
sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia duty.”46 The
Court therefore concluded that the original meaning of the term included all
those “physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense,”47
rather than being limited to “the organized militia.”48 The Court breezed
past the adjective “well-regulated,” writing that it “implies nothing more
than the imposition of proper discipline and training.”49 But we should
pause to consider the interaction between the noun “militia” and its adjective, “well-regulated.” If the militia includes everyone capable of bearing
arms, even if not part of an organized militia, and the government may subject this unorganized “militia” to “proper training and discipline,” then the
preamble envisions comprehensive regulation of all who possess and carry
firearms, not merely those in formal military or paramilitary organizations.
After all, the word “militia” appears only once in the Second Amendment,
and if it includes all who are capable of bearing arms even if not part of an
organized military organization, then this same group is subject to regulatory authority. Accordingly, the regulatory power envisioned in the preamble
extends to the whole of the populace capable of exercising Second
Amendment rights. Moreover, Heller adds that the preamble is properly
consulted to clarify the meaning of the Second Amendment’s operative
clause.50
45

See, e.g., Larson, supra note 12, at 1372–79; Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and
Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1356–62 (2009).
46
554 U.S. at 627. The dissenters added that the first militia act, enacted the same year the Second
Amendment was ratified, defined the militia as “every able-bodied white male citizen between the ages
of 18 and 45” and required each “to ‘provide himself with a good musket or firelock’ and other specified
weaponry.” Id. at 672 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271).
47
Id. at 595 (majority opinion) (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939) (internal
quotation mark omitted)).
48
Id. at 596.
49
Id. at 597.
50
Id. at 577–78.
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Accordingly, the Second Amendment, construed in light of the preamble, recognizes a general regulatory power over the possession and carrying
of firearms (although presumably the source of regulatory authority would
be found outside of the preamble, such as state and local police powers or
the federal power to regulate interstate commerce). For this reason, it is appropriate to construe the term “infringed” in the Second Amendment’s
operative clause in a manner that preserves the regulatory power acknowledged in the preamble. This approach, in turn, does a great deal to explain
the basis for the Court characterizing as “presumptively lawful” regulations
that would otherwise seem to “infringe” the right to “possess” firearms or
“carry in case of confrontation,” such as laws forbidding concealed carry.
To be sure, one could argue that regulatory power under the Second
Amendment is limited to the eighteenth-century regulations extant at the
time of the Second Amendment’s ratification, but that rationale not only is
inconsistent with Heller’s dicta but also fails to take adequate account of
McDonald. In McDonald, a majority of the Court concluded that the
Second Amendment must be understood as it had come to be regarded at
the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification.51 By then, of course,
there was the widespread acceptance of prohibitions on concealed carrying
of firearms,52 as Heller acknowledged.53 It follows that by the time of the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was understood that under the
Second Amendment, regulatory powers were not static and could expand in
response to felt exigencies such as the wave of urban crime in the 1820s
and 1830s that produced the first concealed-carry prohibitions in America.54
Thus, even though the Court rejected an interest-balancing test in Heller,55 a point reiterated in the four-Justice plurality opinion in McDonald,56
the historical acceptance of concealed-carry prohibitions cannot be explained by anything other than this very type of interest-balancing—an approach that does not require the kind of compelling empirical evidence of
necessity that the strict scrutiny test demands. Despite Heller, interest51

See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3038–42 (2010). For elaboration on the argument that the Second Amendment’s incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the
Second Amendment be interpreted as it was understood at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
adoption, see AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 258–66
(1998).
52
See, e.g., ALEXANDER DECONDE, GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 7174 (2001); HALBROOK, supra
note 20, at 93–96; Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The Early American Origins
of Gun Control, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 487, 516–17 (2004); David T. Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen
Armies: Toward a Jurisprudence of the Second Amendment, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 559, 615–17
(1986); Kopel, supra note 20, at 1416–33; Calvin Massey, Guns, Extremists, and the Constitution,
57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1095, 1115–18 (2000).
53
See 554 U.S. at 626.
54
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
55
554 U.S. at 634–35.
56
130 S. Ct. at 3050.
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balancing may be inescapable in Second Amendment jurisprudence.57 To
avoid the need to repudiate what seems like a clear statement to the contrary
in Heller, the Court may utilize a different form of words, such as an undue
burden test, but in practical operation, its approach is likely to be little different.58 No other provision of the Bill of Rights contains the type of textual
acknowledgement of governmental regulatory power found in the Second
Amendment. It would be anomalous, to say the least, for the Court to recognize less regulatory power with respect to Second Amendment rights
than is generally acknowledged with respect to the rest of the Bill of
Rights.59
C.
Even granting that prohibitions on carrying concealed firearms are
likely to survive under some version of an undue burden or interestbalancing test, the question remains whether the Second Amendment grants
a right to carry firearms openly—a right that could effectively immunize
urban gangs from stop-and-frisk tactics, at least for gang members who are
not convicted felons or not otherwise subject to the regulatory powers acknowledged as legitimate in Heller. After all, an undue burden test cannot
render a right nugatory, and as Heller defined the right to bear arms, it
seems inescapable that some sort of right to carry firearms—at least in nonsensitive public places—must be recognized if the right to “bear” arms is to
avoid becoming superfluous in light of the right to “keep” them. Now, we
have finally reached the essential contradiction in the Second Amendment
as applied to contemporary urban America.
While Heller characterized the right to keep and bear arms as an aspect
of what was regarded in the framing era as a natural right of self-defense,60
in contemporary America, a right to keep and bear arms does not necessarily enhance security. Research discloses, for example, that gang members
carry firearms at significantly elevated rates.61 Yet their ability to defend
themselves does not make gang members safer; instead, they face an
enormous risk of violent victimization. For example, a study of Los Angeles County gang members during the crime-spike period estimated that
57

See Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1569–73 (2009).
One student commentator discounted the possibility that the Court would adopt an undue burden
test on the ground that this test has been repudiated by Justices Scalia and Thomas as a matter of due
process jurisprudence. See Gould, supra note 12, at 1573–75. Nevertheless, a majority of the remaining
Justices might well unite behind this approach, and even Justices Scalia and Thomas have proved willing to subscribe to this test when it was necessary to assemble a majority behind a result that they otherwise approved. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146, 146–68 (2007).
59
For a discussion that considers the appropriate standard of scrutiny for the Second Amendment in
light of standards employed for other provisions in the Bill of Rights, see Winkler, supra note 11, at
693–96.
60
554 U.S. at 584–86, 593–95, 606, 609.
61
See Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 18–19.
58
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they were sixty times more likely to be homicide victims than were members of the general population.62 A study of gang members in St. Louis
found a homicide rate 1000 times higher than that of the general population.63 A study of a large African-American drug trafficking gang found
that over a four-year period, gang members had a 25% chance of being
killed.64
The prevalence of violence in gang-dominated neighborhoods, moreover, serves to make firearms more pervasive in those communities, as the
perception of danger in high-crime neighborhoods becomes a further stimulus to carry a gun as a means of self-protection.65 As Jeffrey Fagan and
Deanna Wilkinson’s study of at-risk youth in New York explains, when inner-city youth live under the threat of violence in an environment in which
firearms are prevalent, not only are they more likely to arm themselves, but
they also become increasingly likely to respond to real or perceived threats
and provocations with lethal violence, creating what the authors characterize as a contagion effect.66 There are statistical indications of contagion as
well. A number of studies found that gang-related homicides have an independent and positive effect on the homicide rate.67 One study of homicide
in New York, for example, found evidence of a contagion effect of firearms-related violence, which stimulated additional firearms violence in
nearby areas.68 In such an environment, the prevalence of firearms compromises security rather than enhances it.69
62

Armando Morales, A Clinical Model for the Prevention of Gang Violence and Homicide, in
SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND GANG VIOLENCE 105, 111–12 (Richard C. Cervantes ed., 1992).
63
SCOTT H. DECKER & BARRIK VAN WINKLE, LIFE IN THE GANG: FAMILY, FRIENDS, AND
VIOLENCE 173 (1996).
64
See Sudhir Venkatesh, The Financial Activity of a Modern American Street Gang, in AMERICAN
YOUTH GANGS AT THE MILLENNIUM 239, 242 (Finn-Aage Esbensen et al. eds., 2004).
65
See Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 19–20.
66
Jeffrey Fagan & Deanna L. Wilkinson, Guns, Youth Violence, and Social Identity in Inner Cities,
in 24 CRIME & JUSTICE: YOUTH VIOLENCE 105, 137–75 (Michael Tonry & Mark H. Moore eds., 1998).
For similar accounts, see, for example, MARK R. POGREBIN, PAUL B. STRETESKY & N. PRABHA
UNNITHAN, GUNS, VIOLENCE & CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR: THE OFFENDER’S PERSPECTIVE 69–71 (2009);
David Hemenway et al., Gun Carrying Among Adolescents, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39, 44–47
(1996).
67
See, e.g., Jacqueline Cohen & George Tita, Diffusion in Homicide: Exploring a General Method
for Detecting Spatial Diffusion Processes, 15 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 451, 490–91 (1999);
Jacqueline Cohen et al., The Role of Drug Markets and Gangs in Local Homicide Rates, 2 HOMICIDE
STUD. 241, 257–58 (1998).
68
See Jeffrey Fagan, Deanna L. Wilkinson & Garth Davies, Social Contagion of Violence, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR AND AGGRESSION 688, 701–10 (Daniel J. Flannery et
al. eds., 2007). For a similar finding about Chicago, see Elizabeth Griffiths & Jorge M. Chavez, Communities, Street Guns and Homicide Trajectories in Chicago, 1980–1995: Merging Methods for Examining Homicide Trends Across Space and Time, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 941, 965–69 (2004).
69
Some have claimed that laws entitling individuals to carry concealed firearms have produced reductions in crime. See, e.g., JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME 170–336 (3d ed. 2010). This
conclusion, however, has been subject to fierce criticism. See, e.g., DAVID HEMENWAY, PRIVATE GUNS,
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Consider drive-by shootings, which gang researchers note is unusually
common in gang-related violence.70 Drive-bys accounted for 33% of gangrelated homicides in Los Angeles County between 1989 and 1993, with 590
victims; nearly half of the persons shot at and a quarter of the homicide victims were innocent bystanders.71 The frequency with which innocent bystanders are shot illustrates the disadvantage (from the perpetrator’s
standpoint) of a drive-by shooting—it is not easy to hit the intended target
from a moving vehicle. The tactic makes sense, however, in light of the
rate at which gang members carry firearms. As we have seen,72 with gang
membership comes firearms, and if gang members believe that their targets
are likely to be armed, the drive-by tactic often constitutes the safest way of
approaching one’s target and then making a getaway.73
These are the consequences of a right to “carry in case of confrontation” in high-crime, inner-city neighborhoods. They lay bare the contradiction within the Second Amendment. In the framing era, it may have been
possible to speak of a “right to keep and bear arms” that was “necessary to
the security of a free state,” but in high-crime inner-city neighborhoods, this
formula does not hold. At a minimum, keeping the “militia” “well regulated” is likely to require a great deal more in the way of regulation than in
the framing era. Perhaps a demanding and highly discretionary system of
carry permits, similar to that employed by New York City,74 could lend
PUBLIC HEALTH 100–04 (2004); NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: A CRITICAL REVIEW
125–51 (Charles F. Wellford et al. eds., 2005); TUSHNET, supra note 7, at 85–95; Ian Ayres & John J.
Donohue III, Yet Another Refutation of the More Guns, Less Crime HypothesisWith Some Help from
Moody and Marvell, 6 ECON J. WATCH 35 (2009). In any event, even the advocates of this view make
no claim that it applies in high-crime, urban neighborhoods. Another argument used by firearms proponents—although not linked to declining crime rates—is that firearms are used for defensive purposes at
very high rates. See, e.g., Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and
Nature of Self-defense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150 (1995). More recent work has
cast great doubt on this claim. See, e.g., PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUNS
IN AMERICA: NATIONAL SURVEY ON PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND USE OF FIREARMS 8–11 (1997);
HEMENWAY, supra, at 66–69, 239–40.
70
See, e.g., MALCOLM W. KLEIN, THE AMERICAN STREET GANG 117–18 (1995); Deanna L. Wilkinson & Jeffrey Fagan, The Role of Firearms in Violence “Scripts”: The Dynamics of Gun Events
Among Adolescent Males, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 70 (1996).
71
See H. Range Hutson et al., Drive-By Shootings by Violent Street Gangs in Los Angeles: A FiveYear Review from 1989 to 1993, 3 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 300, 302 (1996). In 1991, there were more
than 1500 gang-related drive-by shootings in Los Angeles. H. Range Hutson et al., Adolescents and
Children Injured or Killed in Drive-by Shootings in Los Angeles, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 324, 324
(1994).
72
See supra notes 61–69 and accompanying text.
73
See WILLIAM B. SANDERS, GANGBANGS AND DRIVE-BYS: GROUNDED CULTURE AND JUVENILE
GANG VIOLENCE 65–74 (1994); James C. Howell, Youth Gangs: An Overview, in AMERICAN YOUTH
GANGS AT THE MILLENNIUM, supra note 64, at 16, 36–37.
74
In New York, state law prohibits possession of a handgun without a license and generally requires that handguns be kept within the licensee’s home or place of business unless the licensee is engaged in law enforcement. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(2) (McKinney 2008). In New York City, an
additional permit must be obtained to possess or carry a handgun. See id. § 400.00(6). The issuance of

449

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

some substance to a right to “bear” arms without threatening urban mayhem, but it is doubtful that high-crime urban areas could go much further
without reinstating the dynamics that led to the crime spike of the late
1980s and early 1990s.75 Such are the problems when an eighteenth-century
right is applied in the twenty-first century. Even so, concern about the consequences of a right to bear arms in urban America is more than a policy
objection to a constitutional command that a Court can properly brush
aside76: it is a concern that the Second Amendment’s preamble requires us
to keep in mind.
How then, are we to resolve the contradiction within the Second
Amendment? It seems that only the still-unresolved Second Amendment
standard of scrutiny can do the critical work.
II. MCDONALD V. CITY OF CHICAGO: THE SECOND AMENDMENT MADE
CLEARER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT MADE MURKY
Joyce Lee Malcolm
Ironically, the landmark Supreme Court decision in McDonald v. City
of Chicago77 resolved one important question, the right of individuals to be
armed, but managed to spawn an even more fundamental one, the proper
standard for incorporation. Two years ago in District of Columbia v. Heller, the Court recognized the Second Amendment’s protection of an individual right “to keep and bear arms,”78 and now, in McDonald, the Court
has incorporated the Second Amendment as a right that must be recognized
by the states.79 These decisions were a triumph for adherence to the popular
understanding at the time of the Amendment’s inclusion in the Bill of
Rights and its acceptance as a fundamental principle of American liberty.
Yet apart from the anticipated impact on gun laws that I consider below, the
conflicting approaches to incorporation so glaring in the McDonald opinions go to the core of our constitutional system. Before replying to Professor Rosenthal’s misgivings about the practical implications of the
McDonald decision, this response considers the issues of how to incorporate the Second Amendment and the appropriate standard for incorporation.

these permits is highly discretionary and generally requires an applicant to demonstrate some extraordinary danger. See N.Y.C., N.Y., COMP. R. CITY tit. 38, §§ 5-01 to -04 (2007).
75
As I have demonstrated elsewhere, there is considerable evidence that New York’s restrictive
permit system has been an important part of its ability to drive violent crime down after the crime-spike
period. See Rosenthal, supra note 12, at 39–40.
76
Cf. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008) (“The very enumeration of the right
takes out of the hands of government—even the Third Branch of Government—the power to decide on a
case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon.”).
77
130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
78
554 U.S. at 595.
79
130 S. Ct. at 3050.
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In considering the basis for incorporation, the Justices were seriously
divided on what the proper means should be. Justice Alito, writing for the
majority, employed the long-accepted approach of incorporating the
Amendment through the Due Process Clause.80 Justice Thomas agreed that
the Second Amendment should be incorporated but wrote a lengthy and
compelling opinion, insisting, as petitioners urged, that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause is the appropriate means for incorporation.81 And Justice Stevens, in his dissent, sidestepped the clear case for incorporation by
devising an amorphous new standard for it—one the Second Amendment
fails to meet—under a version of the Due Process Clause that he dubbed the
“liberty clause.”82 This brief Debate is not the place to explore fully the implications of these conflicting approaches for Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, but I consider them briefly before turning to the appropriatelevel-of-scrutiny aspect of the McDonald decision. I hope to reassure Professor Rosenthal about any potential harm to the “stop and frisk” tactic he
finds essential in combating gang violence.
A.
The debate over the proper means for incorporation begins with the
McDonald petitioners’ argument for incorporating the Second Amendment
through the Privileges or Immunities Clause rather than through the Due
Process Clause—although the issue likely would have arisen anyway.83
Justice Alito and three concurring Justices were unwilling to make that
shift. “For many decades, the question of the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against state infringement has been analyzed under the
Due Process Clause of that Amendment,” Justice Alito wrote.84 “We therefore decline to disturb the Slaughter-House holding.”85 The Justices were
not only concerned with disturbing precedent but also uncertain about the
scope of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.86 In addition to recounting
the historical evidence that an individual right to be armed is “so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,”87 the opinion provided a history of evolving standards for incorpora80

Id. at 3036. Justice Alito was joined in the opinion of the Court by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice
Kennedy, and Justice Scalia. Id. at 3026. Justice Scalia also authored a separate concurring opinion. Id.
at 3050. Justice Thomas concurred in part and concurred in the judgment but wrote a separate opinion.
Id. at 3020.
81
See id. at 3088 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
82
See id. at 3091–104, 3109–10 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer also dissented, joined by
Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor.
83
See Petitioners’ Brief at 9–65, McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (No. 08-1521).
84
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3030–31 (opinion of the Court).
85
Id. at 3031.
86
Id. at 3030.
87
Id. at 3032 (quoting Synder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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tion. Justice Alito pointed out that, beginning in the 1960s, “the Court
abandoned ‘the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States
only a watered-down, subjective version of the individual guarantees of the
Bill of Rights’”;88 the Court no longer asks “whether any ‘civilized system
[can] be imagined that would not accord the particular protection.’”89 The
modern standard for incorporation is simply whether the guarantee in question “is fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty and system of justice.”90
By contrast, Justice Thomas, while providing a moving account of the
atrocities perpetrated against disarmed blacks and abolitionists as well as
society’s acceptance of the fundamental nature of the right to be armed,
made a compelling case for incorporation under the Privileges or Immunities Clause. “I cannot agree,” he wrote, “that [the Second Amendment
right] is enforceable against the States through a clause that speaks only to
‘process.’”91 “The notion that a constitutional provision that guarantees only ‘process’ before a person is deprived of life, liberty, or property could define the substance of those rights strains credulity for even the most casual
user of words.”92 Whereas the majority found the Privileges or Immunities
Clause too vague,93 Justice Thomas found the Due Process Clause equally
problematic:
While this Court has at times concluded that a right gains “fundamental” status
only if it is essential to the American “scheme of ordered liberty” or “deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” the Court has just as often held
that a right warrants Due Process Clause protection if it satisfies a far less
measurable range of criteria.94

Justice Thomas concluded that the Second Amendment is “fully applicable
to the States,” but he did so “because the right to keep and bear arms is
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment as a privilege of American citizenship.”95
In his dissent, Justice Stevens moved into a different realm. Since historical evidence would have led him to support incorporation, he damned its
use, proclaiming that “a rigid historical methodology is unfaithful to the

88

Id. at 3035 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1964)).
Id. at 3034 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968)). Many American
rights such as the separation of church and state, the prohibition against double jeopardy, and the latitude
permitted in freedom of speech are distinct from rights recognized in other Western countries.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 3059 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
92
Id. at 3062.
93
See id. at 3030 (opinion of the Court).
94
Id. at 3061–62 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted)
(second and third quotations quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
95
Id. at 3088.
89
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Constitution’s command.”96 This is especially strange for a Justice who relied upon the historical method in Heller to refute the notion that the
Second Amendment guaranteed an individual right.97 But Justice Stevens
went even further, cutting judges free from the text and intent of the Constitution by insisting that the historical approach “is unfaithful to the expansive principle Americans laid down when they ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment and to the level of generality they chose when they crafted its
language.”98 Since he refused to consider the history of ratification, one
wonders where he got the odd notion that Americans wanted the Fourteenth
Amendment to embody “an expansive principle” rather than to focus on venerable constitutional rights. Justice Stevens added that the historical approach “masks the value judgments that pervade any analysis of what
customs, defined in what manner, are sufficiently ‘rooted’ . . . [and] effaces
this Court’s distinctive role in saying what the law is, leaving the development and safekeeping of liberty to majoritarian political processes.”99 Justice Scalia objected vehemently to this view of objectivity and
subjectivity.100
Having rejected any examination of the historical approach, Justice
Stevens resorted to a lengthy linguistic analysis of the words “liberty” and
“incorporation.”101 Indeed, not until page twenty-seven of his dissent did he
actually turn to a consideration of the Second Amendment.102 Justice Stevens then reverted, for this one Amendment, to those approaches to incorporation that Justice Alito explained were discarded by the Court fifty years
earlier: that the right incorporated “need not be identical in shape or scope
to the rights protected against Federal Government infringement by the various provisions of the Bill of Rights”;103 that as “local differences are to be
cherished as elements of liberty,”104 judges must be concerned about “undu-

96

Id. at 3098 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Supreme Court and the Uses of History: District of Columbia v.
Heller, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1377, 1378–79 (2009).
98
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3098 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99
Id. at 3098–99.
100
Id. at 3051–52 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The subjective nature of Justice Stevens’ standard is also apparent from his claim that it is the courts’ prerogative—indeed their duty—to update the Due
Process Clause so that it encompasses new freedoms the Framers were too narrow-minded to imagine.
Courts, he proclaims, must ‘do justice to [the Clause’s] urgent call and its open texture’ by exercising
the ‘interpretive discretion the latter embodies’ . . . . And it would be ‘judicial abdication’ for a judge
to . . . ‘outsourc[e]’ the job to ‘historical sentiment.’” (citations omitted)). Justice Scalia’s opinion is
primarily devoted to refuting Justice Stevens’s novel approach to Fourteenth Amendment incorporation
rather than to Justice Stevens’s treatment of the Second Amendment. Id. at 3051–56.
101
See id. at 3090–101 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102
See id. at 3103.
103
Id. at 3093.
104
Id. (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting NRA v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856, 860 (7th
Cir. 2009)).
97
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ly restricting the States’ ‘broad latitude in experimenting’”;105 and lastly,
that judges need to consider whether the right under scrutiny is one that
“other civilized societies” recognize as central to liberty.106 In any event,
Justice Stevens frankly refused to accept the Court’s holding in Heller,
claiming it “sheds no light on the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”107 To Justice Stevens, the Second Amendment
“still serves the structural function of protecting the States from encroachment by an overreaching Federal Government.”108 In his view, it is, in fact,
a federal provision with no individual-right aspect related to self-defense.109
Justice Breyer, agreeing with the dissenters, argued for an additional
requirement for incorporation: popular consensus.110 Justice Alito rejected
this proposition out of hand, writing: “We have never held that a provision
of the Bill of Rights applies to the States only if there is a ‘popular consensus’ that the right is fundamental, and we see no basis for such a rule.”111
However, Justice Alito added, in this instance there is evidence of such a
consensus since 58 members of the Senate and 251 members of the House
submitted an amicus brief in support of incorporation and 38 states submitted another.112
To summarize, the Court has given us three distinct means for incorporation: (1) the now-customary Due Process Clause; (2) the more historically
accurate Privileges or Immunities Clause; and (3) Justice Stevens’s novel
“Liberty Clause.” Justice Breyer’s “popular consensus” approach is arguably a fourth method. Justice Scalia particularly took issue with Justice Stevens’s approach because it reverted, at least for the Second Amendment, to
separating rights into different classes. It would leave judges, rather than
the Constitution and the political process, as the propounders of what is or
is not a fundamental right. Although the issue may seem of minor importance since nearly all of the amendments in the Bill of Rights have been incorporated already, there is a universe of other “liberties” the Court might
in the future decide are fundamental rights. Justice Scalia found great danger in Justice Stevens’s vision of the role of the Court:
Justice Stevens abhors a system in which “majorities or powerful interest
groups always get their way” but replaces it with a system in which unelected
105

Id. at 3100 (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597
(1977)).
106
See id. at 3096.
107
Id. at 3090. It seems surprising that a case about the meaning of one amendment should be regarded as remiss for not shedding light on another. Justice Stevens found no need for what he characterized as “jot-for-jot incorporation” of an amendment. See id. at 3095.
108
Id. at 3111.
109
See id. at 3107 n.33, 3112–13 & nn.41–42.
110
See id. at 3124 (Breyer, J., dissenting). A “popular” consensus carries the implication of a current, even ephemeral, view.
111
Id. at 3049 (majority opinion).
112
Id.
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and life-tenured judges always get their way. That such usurpation is effected
unabashedly . . . makes it even worse. In a vibrant democracy, usurpation
should have to be accomplished in the dark. It is Justice Stevens’ approach,
not the Court’s, that puts democracy in peril.113

Justice Scalia’s warning about the hazard to our constitutional system
posed by Justice Stevens’s approach is well taken. Justice Stevens’s approach would free judges from the restraint of legal precedent and constitutional text. It would give unelected judges license to indulge their personal
views with little regard for the Constitution or the legal system they swear
to uphold. None of the other Justices joined Justice Stevens in this last opinion of his tenure on the Court.
B.
This Rebuttal now turns to the McDonald decision and the serious
question of the appropriate level of scrutiny for Second Amendment rights.
Since fundamental rights are not to be separated into first- and second-class
status, the strict scrutiny applied to the First Amendment freedom of the
press and freedom of speech should also be applied to Second Amendment
rights.114 All rights have some restrictions, and the Second Amendment is
no different. Indeed, the Heller opinion explicitly acknowledged that nothing in the opinion “should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on
the commercial sale of arms.”115 As Professor Rosenthal correctly notes,
beyond this disclaimer, the Heller Court did not squarely deal with the term
“infringed” in the Amendment’s text.116 In Heller, it was not a significant
issue. Nonetheless, Justice Scalia assured in his opinion in Heller that the
Court is not ignorant of the handgun violence in this country.117 But as Justice Scalia put it, “the enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily
takes certain policy choices off the table. These include the absolute prohi-

113

Id. at 3058 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (quoting id. at 3119 (Stevens, J., dissent-

ing)).
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See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2987–88 (2010) (citing Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270, 276 (1981)) (applying strict scrutiny in the context of regulating religious
speech); Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010) (applying strict scrutiny to assess laws burdening political speech). Not all restrictions on speech are reviewed under a strict scrutiny standard.
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–84 (1992) (holding that strict scrutiny should not be
applied to challenge regulation of obscene or defamatory speech).
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See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008).
116
See supra Part I.B (Rosenthal Opening); cf. Heller, 554 U.S. at 592–95 (discussing the portion
of the Second Amendment that establishes that the right shall not be infringed but declining to analyze
the word “infringed”).
117
See 554 U.S. at 636.
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bition of handguns held and used for self-defense in the home.”118 The
Court also emphasized that the District of Columbia has many constitutional options to combat the problem of violent crime.119
In that light, the regulations put in place by Washington, D.C., after the
Heller Court overturned its gun ban are clearly designed to achieve the
same result as the former ban by making the procedures for registering a
handgun in the city as onerous as possible.120 An applicant must go through
two background checks; make four visits to the police department; provide
fingerprints, a photo, and a job history; pass a twenty-question test on D.C.
firearms laws; pass a five-hour class with a trainer selected from a list the
city provides, including one hour on a gun range (the city doesn’t have one
nor will it permit a gun shop or gun sales in city limits); and pay $300 in
fees—after all of which the gun must be taken back to the police and fired
for a ballistic test.121 As of 2011, a gun must be equipped with a special
identification technology that has not yet been adopted by the industry.122
The registration expires after three years; if it lapses the police may seize
the gun, and the owner is subject to up to one year in jail and to a fine of
$1000.123
Likewise, Chicago passed a new ordinance four days after the Supreme
Court overturned its gun ban.124 The new rule permits residents to own a
handgun in the home but imposes serious restrictions and a series of bureaucratic hurdles intended to discourage ownership.125 Gun shops are
banned in the city, as are all firearms sales.126 The registrant must pass a
four-hour class; spend one hour on a gun range (the city bans gun ranges);
and transport the gun “broken down,” unloaded, and in a case.127 The owner
must keep the gun inside a building; it is illegal to take it into a garage or to
bring it onto a porch or to a yard.128 Each gun must be registered within five
days of purchase.129 The first test of the McDonald decision will be these
new municipal regulations that are seemingly designed to circumvent citi118

Id. (emphasis added).
See id.
120
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zens’ lawful right to keep a handgun in their homes for self-defense. Five
days before the new Chicago gun regulation went into effect, a federal lawsuit had already been filed against the city.130
C.
As to further tests of the McDonald decision, Professor Rosenthal has
particular anxieties. Are they justified? Is Professor Rosenthal correct that
not only allowing law-abiding residents of Chicago to have firearms in their
homes but granting them the right to carry weapons would severely hamper
the effectiveness of the city’s stop-and-frisk strategies—with dire results?131
Indeed, Professor Rosenthal raises the specter that this would produce an
escalating homicide rate and also “could enable urban street gangs to act as
occupying armies.”132 He even envisions a world where gangs could commit no overt crimes in police officers’ presence and in turn use “their ability
to go about armed” in order to “establish criminal mini-states based on drug
trafficking.”133
Calm reflection is called for to put the situation in context. The City of
Chicago has banned residents from keeping handguns, rifles, and shotguns
for their defense since 1982,134 some twenty-eight years. But as Justice Alito reminded us, that has not made Otis McDonald or others living in what
are still high-crime areas safer.135 Chicago’s prohibition has not swept guns
from the city. It has only succeeded in disarming those who obey the law,
leaving them vulnerable to thugs who have no intention of registering their
guns. Although the police are free to “stop and frisk” those they suspect of
criminal intent, the number of Chicago homicide victims this year equaled
the number of American soldiers killed during the same period in Afghanistan and Iraq together.136 In fact, two Illinois legislators representing Chicago districts called on the Governor of the state to deploy the National Guard
to patrol the city streets.137
The 1976 District of Columbia gun ban overturned by the Heller decision was no more successful. A study comparing the District with fortynine other major cities found the District’s homicide rate was substantially
higher relative to those cities than it had been before its gun ban was
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See Duaa Eldeib & Dahleen Glanton, Plaintiffs Aim to Shoot Down Chicago’s Gun Ordinance,
CHICAGOBREAKINGNEWS.COM, July 7, 2010, http://www.chicagobreakingnews.com/2010/07/lawsuitfiled-against-chicagos-new-gun-ordinance.html.
131
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passed.138 However, as Justice Breyer noted, other scholarship has shown
that ownership of a handgun increases public safety.139
While forty states presently permit law-abiding residents who fulfill
certain requirements to carry a concealed weapon, Professor Rosenthal can
take heart from the fact that firearms crime on the whole has not risen. This
permissive approach to gun possession has not unleashed a rash of shootouts; the nation’s homicide rate has been declining for more than thirty
years.140 Although gun ownership surged in 2009,141 the FBI crime report
for that year shows that crime rates dropped across America.142 Firearms in
the hands of lawful citizens can and do deter would-be assailants.143 Success, of course, has many fathers, but Professor Rosenthal would have you
believe the power of police to stop and frisk people on the street was the
sole cause for this decline. An article in the Christian Science Monitor
suggests six reasons why serious crime has been in decline—of which
“proactive” policing is only one—and includes a variety of approaches to
reducing crime in addition to frisking.144
One rather strained concern Professor Rosenthal raises involves the use
of the word “well regulated” in the Second Amendment’s Militia Clause.145
He notes that “the [Heller] Court breezed past” the adjective “wellregulated,” dismissing it as “impl[ying] nothing more than the imposition of
proper discipline and training.”146 Quite right. They did breeze by it, and it
does merely mean “well-trained.” A militia that is not well-trained is more
dangerous than useful. However, while the militia was, with certain exceptions, drawn from the entire population of citizens, the well-trained and
drilled militia included only those physically fit men between the ages of
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District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 700–02 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice
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141
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eighteen and forty-five.147 But since the text merely describes the militia as
“well-regulated,” Professor Rosenthal argues that the Second Amendment,
“construed in light of the preamble,” gives government the authority to subject the larger group—the unorganized militia—to “proper training and discipline,” thereby giving the government “comprehensive regulation of all
who possess and carry firearms.”148 He goes on to posit that such an approach explains the Court’s acceptance of regulations—such as concealed
weapons prohibitions—that would otherwise seem to infringe on the right
to possess firearms.149
Professor Rosenthal gets an A for invention, but this interpretation is
not credible. It waives aside the acknowledged fact that no right is absolute
and that therefore laws that in some way restricted the right to be armed by
prohibiting unsafe use before the adoption of the Second Amendment were
not regarded as infringing on the core right. Professor Rosenthal’s reference to an argument limiting regulations to those of the eighteenth century
is, he admits, “inconsistent with Heller’s dicta”150—or, one might add,
common sense. But he nevertheless tethers his argument for the government’s (necessary) regulatory authority to the Second Amendment’s “wellregulated militia” reference. That analysis is a bucket that will not hold water.
D.
To conclude, the McDonald decision has incorporated the Second
Amendment right as a core right, not as a second-class, watered-down version that can be effectively thwarted by state or city action. Are reasonable
regulations “interest-balancing”? If so, then reasonable regulations of all
core rights are interest-balancing. Are there dangers in granting lawful citizens a right to keep and bear arms? Yes, but there are dangers in every
right. “It is implicit in a genuine right,” Professor T.R.S. Allan explains,
“that its exercise may work against [some facet of] the public interest: a
right to speak only where its exercise advanced the public welfare or public
policy . . . would be a hollow guarantee against repression.”151 The experience of a majority of states, however, has shown that honoring the right of
the people to keep and bear arms does in fact protect life.
147

See JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN
RIGHT 138–40 (1994).
148
See supra Part I.B (Rosenthal Opening).
149
See supra Part I.B (Rosenthal Opening).
150
See supra Part I.B (Rosenthal Opening).
151
See T.R.S. ALLAN, LAW, LIBERTY, AND JUSTICE: THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF BRITISH
CONSTITUTIONALISM 140 (1993). Professor Allan, Professor of Public Law and Jurisprudence at Cambridge University, is paraphrasing Lord Justice Browne-Wilkinson’s dissent in Wheeler v. Leicester
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III. SECOND AMENDMENT PLUMBING AFTER MCDONALD: A REPLY TO
PROFESSOR MALCOLM
Lawrence Rosenthal
Professor Malcolm worries about some things and not others. She is
concerned about what she regards as the historical inaccuracy of all of the
opinions but Justice Thomas’s in McDonald v. City of Chicago,152 but she is
supremely confident that her vigorous conception of Second Amendment
rights will not lead to chaos in the inner city. I am afraid that she rather has
things backwards.
A.
Let us start with Professor Malcolm’s assessment of McDonald. She
commends Justice Thomas’s opinion, which, she tells us, “made a compelling case for incorporation [of the Second Amendment] under the Privileges
or Immunities Clause.”153 She tells us that this approach, of those taken by
the various opinions in McDonald, is “the more historically accurate.”154 In
the opinion that Professor Malcolm finds so compelling, Justice Thomas
told us that “constitutional provisions are ‘written to be understood by the
voters.’ Thus, the objective of this inquiry is to discern what ‘ordinary citizens’ at the time of ratification would have understood the Privileges or
Immunities Clause to mean.”155 After reviewing the historical evidence,
Justice Thomas concluded that “the ratifying public understood the Privileges or Immunities Clause to protect constitutionally enumerated rights,
including the right to keep and bear arms.”156 Justice Thomas did indeed
make a compelling case, if only because he so assiduously overlooked virtually all of the historical evidence inconsistent with his conclusion.
I have elsewhere canvassed the confusing and conflicting evidence on
the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.157 I will not repeat that discussion here, but it is worth noting
some of Justice Thomas’s most remarkable omissions. If, for example, the
public understood that the Fourteenth Amendment made all constitutionally
enumerated rights binding on the states, one might expect some effort in the
ratifying states to make their own laws consistent with these enumerated
152

130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
Supra Part II.A (Malcolm Rebuttal).
154
Supra Part II.A (Malcolm Rebuttal).
155
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3063 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(citations omitted) (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576 (2008)) (some internal
quotation marks omitted).
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Id. at 3077.
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rights. Yet ratification produced no effort to bring state laws into conformity with the Bill of Rights.158 In particular, ratification did nothing to halt a
trend in the states toward prosecution by information, despite its inconsistency with the Fifth Amendment’s Grand Jury Clause.159 This is not what
one would expect had there been a general understanding that the Fourteenth Amendment had rendered all enumerated constitutional rights applicable to the states. About this historical evidence, Justice Thomas
offered no comment.
Justice Thomas also noted that three framing-era treatises indicated
that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated constitutionally enumerated rights against the states.160 Yet Justice Thomas ignored significant
ambiguities and errors in those treatises and failed to mention that other
leading treatises of the era found no incorporationist meaning in the
Fourteenth Amendment.161 Again, if there had been a general understanding that the Fourteenth Amendment made the Second Amendment
and other constitutional rights previously protected against only the federal government applicable to the states, surely it is remarkable that
leading legal scholars of the day such as Joel Prentiss Bishop, Thomas
Cooley, John Forrest Dillon, and Francis Wharton somehow did not get
the message.162
As for judicial discussions of the Fourteenth Amendment in the
wake of ratification, Justice Thomas told us that one lower court, in a
decision “written by a future Justice of this Court,” issued an opinion
embracing incorporation,163 but he left unmentioned two other framingera decisions to the contrary.164 Even more striking, Justice Thomas was
evidently unconcerned that those actually sitting on the Court rejected
an incorporationist reading of the Fourteenth Amendment in a series of
framing-era cases.165 In United States v. Cruikshank,166 for example, the
Court found infirm counts of an indictment alleging violations of the right
to keep and bear arms, brought under the Enforcement Act of 1870, which
158
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prohibited conspiracies to “hinder . . . free exercise and enjoyment of any right
or privilege . . . secured . . . by the constitution or laws of the United
States,”167 writing: “The second amendment declares that it shall not be infringed; but this, as has been seen, means no more than that it shall not be inThe Cruikshank Court added that
fringed by Congress.”168
nondiscrimination was the animating principle of the Fourteenth Amendment: “The equality of the rights of citizens is a principle of republicanism. . . . The only obligation resting upon the United States is to see that the
States do not deny the right. This the amendment guarantees, but no
more.”169
For his part, Justice Thomas acknowledged that his view was inconsistent with Cruikshank and other framing-era precedents of the Supreme
Court.170 Yet he failed to consider whether the framing-era Court’s take on
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment undermined his own assessment
of the historical evidence of original meaning.171 It is curious, to say the
least, that Justice Thomas gave more weight to the view of “a future Justice” than to the views of those actually serving on the Court.172 Justice
Thomas’s disdain for the views of the framing-era Supreme Court is even
more inexplicable when one considers that he had several years earlier
joined an opinion affording special deference to the Court’s framing-era decisions interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment due to “the insight attributable to the Members of the Court at that time,” since they “obviously had
intimate knowledge and familiarity with the events surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.”173
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My point is not that the preponderance of the historical evidence tilts
against incorporation. My own view is that the historical evidence is sufficiently near equipoise, and sufficiently fragmentary and unreliable, that it
provides no satisfactory basis for resolution of the incorporation debate.174
For present purposes, however, the important point is that Justice Thomas’s
opinion in McDonald—and Professor Malcolm’s eager embrace of it—is
rather an argument against originalist constitutional adjudication. Much has
been written of the dangers of “law office history,” in which historical evidence of original meaning is assessed with an advocate’s jaundiced eye that
cherry-picks only the evidence supporting a predetermined conclusion.175
Justice Thomas’s opinion is a pretty good example of the problem. Any
case looks easy if one looks to only the evidence in favor of one’s preferred
conclusion.
B.
Professor Malcolm, while advocating “strict scrutiny” for firearms
regulations,176 seems unconcerned with what this may mean for firearms
violence in the inner city because “the nation’s homicide rate has been
declining for more than thirty years,”177 and a reporter for the Christian
Science Monitor assures her that there are six reasons for the crime decline “of which ‘proactive’ policing is only one—and includes a variety
of approaches to reducing crime in addition to frisking.”178 For those
who take their criminology from sources other than the Christian
Science Monitor, however, there is cause for concern.
Professor Malcolm’s account of homicide rates in recent decades is
flat-out wrong; as I have explained elsewhere, there was an enormous
and unprecedented spike in homicide and other forms of violent crime in
the late 1980s and early 1990s, concentrated in firearms-related crime in
disadvantaged inner-city communities, as a consequence of the violent
competition following the introduction of crack cocaine.179 The crimerise period was followed by a crime decline reaching levels not seen in
nearly four decades,180 which had no evident demographic or economic
explanation.181 Professor Malcolm seems to favor John Lott’s theory
that the prevalence of laws permitting the carrying of concealed wea174
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pons stimulated crime declines,182 but as I noted in my Opening, there
are serious methodological challenges to Lott’s work.183 In any event,
Lott himself makes no claim that any significant portion of the crime drop
since the early 1990s can be attributed to concealed-carry laws.184 And as I
also noted in my Opening, the ability to carry firearms offers no guarantee
of effective self-defense, at least in unstable urban neighborhoods. Members of criminal street gangs carry firearms at vastly elevated levels compared to the general population, yet they also have vastly elevated homicide
victimization rates.185 More guns do not always mean less crime.
Consider New York City, which had violent crime rates typical of
other large cities in 1990, but in the succeeding decade achieved crime
declines of about double those in the rest of the country and outperformed each of the nation’s other fifteen largest cities.186 There is much
evidence that the decline resulted from an escalation in stop-and-frisk
tactics associated with enforcement of New York’s tough gun control
laws.187 Those laws are indeed stringent: New York rarely issues permits
authorizing the possession or carrying of handguns, and for that reason,
its laws have been characterized as imposing an effective handgun
ban.188 Thus, a regulatory regime nearly as rigorous as that invalidated
in Heller—and quite different than that advocated by Lott—when
coupled with aggressive stop-and-frisk tactics, has the best record in the
country when it comes to reducing big-city violent crime.189
182
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C.
As for her advocacy of strict scrutiny,190 although she never bothers
to explain how her proposal for strict scrutiny of firearms regulations
can be squared with Heller’s list of “presumptively lawful regulatory
measures,”191 Professor Malcolm claims that my reliance on the Second
Amendment’s preamble as a source of regulatory authority “is a bucket
that will not hold water.”192 She does not, however, actually get around
to giving a reason to support this conclusion.
As I explained in my Opening, if one were to consult no more than
the original meaning of the Second Amendment’s operative clause, there
would seem to be no power to limit the right to possess and carry firearms in common civilian use.193 Nor is framing-era practice much help;
although Professor Malcolm claims that “laws that in some way restricted the right to be armed by prohibiting unsafe use before the adoption of the Second Amendment were not regarded as infringing on the
core right,”194 in Heller, the Court concluded that there was little framingera support for firearms regulation aside from laws addressing gunpowder
storage and the discharge of firearms.195 Such regulations seem entirely
compatible with the operative clause’s protection of a right to possess and
carry firearms in common use—unlike many of the other prohibitions
deemed presumptively lawful in Heller. Professor Malcolm, in short, has

officers were less thorough in filling out forms when they knew there would be no criminal case arising
from the encounter. Reliance on these reports to assess compliance with the Fourth Amendment is perilous since the reports are not made for that purpose but rather are intended as a source of investigative
leads. See James J. Fyfe, Stops, Frisks, Searches, and the Constitution, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y
376, 392–94 (2004). In any event, these data do not endeavor to establish that police reports involving
arrests based on probable cause were any more likely to fail to articulate sufficient facts to support the
arrest than were reports involving stops. At most, the data may reflect no more than the risk of error inherent in all police activity.
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no textual explanation for the Heller dicta on permissible firearms regulation—dicta she nevertheless endorses.196
Nor does the rubric of “strict scrutiny” explain Heller’s discussion of
“presumptively lawful” gun control measures. Even if some allowance for
regulations that pass searching judicial scrutiny could be squared with the
Second Amendment’s text as Professor Malcolm reads it, strict scrutiny
does not ordinarily tolerate purely prophylactic regulation such as prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons justified as an effort to prevent violent
confrontations. In one of the First Amendment strict scrutiny cases that
Professor Malcolm cites, for example, the Court rejected an argument that a
statutory prohibition on corporate-funded electioneering could be justified
as a means to prevent corruption because the prohibition swept beyond the
type of corrupt quid pro quo that the government has a compelling interest
in preventing.197 If we are to take strict scrutiny seriously, it is hard to understand how a ban on carrying concealed firearms could fare any better.
If, however, the Second Amendment’s operative clause is construed in
light of the preamble’s contemplation of a “well regulated militia,” that is,
“the imposition of proper discipline and training” on not only those enrolled
in a formal military organization but also all who are “physically capable of
acting in concert for the common defense,”198 then the Second Amendment
envisions unusually comprehensive regulatory authority of the type blessed
by the Heller dicta.
The Second Amendment is, after all, a legal text. Surely an approach
to the Second Amendment standard of scrutiny that is compatible with the
text is preferable to one that is not. My own reliance on the Second
Amendment’s preamble to establish a standard of scrutiny has a textual
foundation; Professor Malcolm’s approach, as far as I can tell, has none.
I’ll take mine.
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